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Mere-Orthodoxy: 06/01/2005 - 07/01/2005

Friday, June 24, 2005

A Reflection on Marriage

This is the eve of my wedding. I have been silent the last week, both because of my grandfather's passing and my wedding preparations. The readings for tomorrow are designed to show that my love for my bride is simply an image of the Father's love for his children--that ultimately human love must have its origin and its grounding in the love of the Father for us. To this end, Isaiah 62, which I also read for my proposal will be read. Additionally, Psalm 45 and passages from Revelation 19 will be read. They are also designed to root our understanding of our union within God's covenental relationship with Israel, which has eschatalogical ramifications. To that end, we will look backward at the promise He makes in Isaiah 62, while looking forward to the completion of the promise as described in Revelation. I love my bride, but on this wedding day I hope only to be humbled by her love for me and the Father's love for me. I will count myself tomorrow among all men most richly blessed. Incidentally, my wonderful bride-to-be has nixed any honeymoon blogging, so my keyboard will fall silent for a few weeks. For those of you who have discovered Mere-O, I only hope you will continue to be faithful readers and commentors when I return. The peace of the Lord be always with you.

Thursday, June 16, 2005

New Look for the Blogdom of God

The Truth Laid Bear has a new look, as does the "Blogdom of God" aggregator. The updates have inspired (as always) controversy amongst the Godbloggers. Interesting fact about the Blogdom of God list: Mere Orthodoxy is ranked 431 on the list, right beneath Mere-O friend and commentor Richard, who blogs at lawreligionculturereview and is listed at number 430.

Tuesday, June 14, 2005

Death comes to all Men

You know you've been blogging for a while when blogging becomes an important outlet for the deeper thoughts of your normal life. Or in this case, normal death. Today, my grandfather passed away. As I reflected on his death, I was reminded of this post by Keith, and even more by this comment by Mere-O friend Lindsay:

One of the most satisfying elements of Christianity, for me, is its assessment of death as an unnatural occurence. We react so strongly against it precisely because it's an intruder, robbing us of loved ones that may have grown old in body but whose spirits have not been exhausted.
Unlike death on a national or international level, this is my first experience of death on a personal level. My grandfather was a caring, yet often stubborn old man. He was the only member of my father's side of the family that I ever knew, and I will miss him. The grieving process is difficult and painful, but it must be seized. I have never found the Lord more near as when I have contemplated my mortality. Now, as I contemplate mortality again, I am comforted by the fact that we serve a Lord who understands all aspects of the human experience, including death, and who provides us with hope for a new life. Death comes to all men, indeed, but life only to those who will be in Christ. 'Requiem aeternam dona eis, Domine, et lux perpetua luceat eis. ' 'Give to them eternal peace, Lord, and let light perpetual shine upon them.'

On Why ID Matters

Reading my brother's latest comment, I realized why ID matters for our broader worldviews. The Discovery Center's website (the Discovery Center is the hub of ID activity) states:

The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection.
This entails two things about the universe: (1) There is intentionality in the universe. The physical world is the way it is because it was originally intended to be that way. (2) There is a rational structure to the universe. This is closely linked to (1), but it makes all the difference in the world. Fundamentally, ID posits that a intelligent agent caused things to be the way they are, and not some other way. That means that when we ask "Why is the world the way it is?", there is the possibility of an reason beyond "It just happened that way." Nietsche characterized the history of the West as a war between Homer and Plato, and we have returned to that war. Homer's Iliad depicts gods who act capriciously, who are fundamentally irrational. The most basic fact of the universe is power, not rationality, and consequently there is only war. Plato, even if you disagree with his metaphysics, is the first major philosopher to argue that fundamentally reason must be at the center of the universe, not unreasoning power. This is the fundamental disagreement between ID and neo-Darwinianism. If there is an intelligent design to the universe, then the universe is rational, not a-rational (which always reduces to irrationality). If there is no intelligent design, then power becomes the chief virtue. My brother's comment referenced this page from talkorigins. Included on it is this statement about the history of theories of the cosmos pre-Darwin: "Anti-evolutionary ideas have been around for millennia and have not yet contributed anything with any practical application." Homer and Plato are yet at war, though they have chosen a new field of battle.

Sunday, June 12, 2005

Natural Law and Sexual Ethics

Way back on May 22nd, my brother posed this dilemma for natural law advocates:

If anything would be unnatural and contradictory to the function of sex, it would be castration, the severest form of male birth control. Yet it is approved by Jesus, perhaps echoing the text of Isaiah 56:4-5, which affirms that eunuchs have a special place in God's heart.
The discussion on natural law began with this post by Ed Feser, which is an excellent introductory essay on traditional natural law theory. America's most prominent natural law theorist, Robert George, articulates and defends a slightly different form of natural law than Feser's. Since I claim to be a natural law theorist, I will outline the view here before addressing my brother's complaint. In this I will lean heavily on Feser's excellent summation. If you are already familiar with the natural law theory or already read Feser's post, then I would encourage you to skip the following. If not, then you may find it enlightening. Feser begins by pointing out that traditional conceptions of natural law theory begin with the notion that "things" have forms, which might be understood as 'natures' or 'essences.' In other words, there is a 'human nature' that all humans have. Goodness, then, is the actualization (what Aquinas calls a 'second actualization') of the form or essence. Feser's example is of a squirrel: "A good squirrel is one which flourishes in the sense that it realizes its squirrel nature to the fullest: it scampers up trees and avoids predators, gathers its food, rests when it needs to, and in general does well all the things that squirrels by their nature tend to do." Important to this concept is the notion of 'natural ends' of forms or essences. Natural law theory has always suggested that natures have specific functions or purposes that stem from the sort of things they are. For instances, kitchen knives have the purpose of cutting vegetables. A "good knife" is one that cuts vegetables well, since it is performing it's 'natural end' or acting like the sort of thing it is (i.e. a knife). Yet this is obviously too simplistic with regard to humans. Aquinas is very clear that 'natural law' is an extension of reason and that humans have the unique ability to rationally deliberate about their ends, and to choose which ends to bring about, unlike the case of the knife (or squirrel). Again, Feser says it better:
A fully good human being, in the not-yet-moral sense of “good” used above, is one who has fully realized his natural potentials. And a morally good human being is just one who tends to choose to act in a way that will lead him to realize those potentials. By the same token, just as a bad human being, in the not-yet-moral sense, is one who fails to realize those potentials, a morally bad human being is one who tends to choose to act in a way that keeps him from realizing them.
Now to the interesting stuff. Feser extends his discussion of natural law into sexual ethics, and it's his discussion here that later commenters latched on to (see here and here, as well as my brother's post). The money quotes from Feser:
Since it’s the natural law theory example that critics of the theory always get the most worked up over, let’s look at sex. One way to understand the traditional natural law view of the matter is this. If you consider the sexual drives that human beings have, then it is blindingly obvious that if those drives have any natural purpose at all – if they were, say, designed with a certain end in view – then that purpose is to get people to use their sexual organs. And if you consider the sexual organs themselves, then it is also blindingly obvious that if they were designed with any purpose in mind, then that purpose is procreation. More specifically, the purpose of a penis – again, if you assume that it was indeed designed with a purpose in mind – is quite obviously to deposit semen into a vagina (and also, of course, to urinate). That’s what it’s for, if indeed it is for anything, and whether or not it can be used for other purposes.
And:
It must also be emphasized that, contrary to another common misunderstanding, “unnatural” in the context of the view I’m describing does not mean “using something other than for its natural purpose.” It means “using it in a manner contrary to its natural purpose.” To borrow an example from Michael Levin, there is nothing unnatural about merely tapping out a little song on your teeth, even if that’s not what teeth are for. But there is something unnatural about painting little pictures on your teeth and then refusing ever to eat again lest the pictures be rubbed off, or pulling them out so as to make a necklace out of them. The former sort of act does not frustrate the natural end of teeth, but the latter acts do. And part of the idea in the traditional natural law understanding of the sexual act is that ejaculating into a Kleenex, or a condom, or into any bodily orifice other than a vagina, doesn’t just involve using an organ other than for its natural purpose (which is not necessarily “unnatural”) but that it uses it in a manner contrary to its natural purpose. For the “aim” or point of arousal and ejaculation, if they have an aim or point at all, is to get semen into a vagina, and the acts just described frustrate that aim. For the same reason, not every human intervention in the natural order counts as “unnatural.” Putting eyeglasses on doesn’t “interfere with nature” in a sense that traditional natural law theory would take exception to, because what glasses do is remedy a defect that keeps eyes from performing their natural function. The point of glasses is not to interfere with an organ’s performance of its natural function, but rather to aid it in performing that function. By contrast, the point of birth control devices is to stop an organ from performing its natural function. So such devices do “interfere with nature” in a sense that is illicit from the traditional natural law point of view.
Now, the lengthy summary of the discussion is perhaps superfluous, but the scholar in me made me treat this more like an essay than a blog post. Hopefully my brother's dilemma is a bit more forceful (if you're still reading). In short, it is this: Natural law tradition (as Feser explains it) deems using sexual organs in a manner contrary to their intended purpose (procreation) illicit. Jesus (allegedly) sanctions (following the OT) 'using' the sexual organs in a manner contrary to their intended purpose, i.e. destroying them (see Matthew 19:11-12). I have two replies to the dilemma, one to Feser and the other to my brother. In reverse order: 1) My brother claims that Jesus sanctions castration, which (quite obviously) would be contrary to the intended purpose of the sexual organs. However, he takes no thought of the surrounding context of either Isaiah 56:4-5 or Matthew 19:11-12. Regarding the former, it's not clear at all what Jewish 'eunuchs' actually were. It seems marriage was highly regarded in Jewish culture, especially since the blessing of Abraham is to his descendants as well (Genesis 17:6-7). It's not clear that Israel had any real 'eunuch' culture where they intentionally castrated themselves. Jesus's words, though, are much clearer since we don't need to rely at all on extra-biblical knowledge of the culture. In suggesting that Jesus is sanctioning castration in these passages, my brother glosses over the fact that Jesus is answering a worry from his disciples about marriage: "If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is better not to marry" (19:10). Jesus replies by identifying three levels of 'eunuchs'--some are born that way (which doesn't seem like castration at all), some are made that way by men (castration) and some 'have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven.' Given that Jesus has already used the term 'eunuch' to refer to a group of individuals who have not been castrated, then it's not at all obvious that he is suggesting castration for this third group. Rather, he is commending a lifestyle of celibacy and continence, of deliberate singlehood for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. In other words, he is describing the monastic tradition. So there is nothing in this verse that contradicts the traditional natural law tradition. Jesus and His followers do not misunderstand each other so badly as my brother thought. 2) However, this underscores for me a complaint I have with Feser's characterization of sexual ethics within the natural law tradition. Fundamentally, Feser reduces the 'purpose' of the sex drive to the purpose of the sex organ, a reduction that I am not comfortable with. What it entails is a view of the sex drive that is more physical than personal. My rejoinder would simply be to view the 'sex drive' as an expression of the whole person, of the whole human nature, which means that it may find expressions outside the sex act or any sexual act. Fundamentally, the physical 'sex drive' is a physical manifestation of a deeper desire to create, what the Greeks called 'eros' which comes from the whole person, body and soul. On this view, the aforementioned monastics are simply directing their eros and all the energy therein (which most often comes out as sexual energy) toward a different object--the Church. In other words, Feser's suggestion that "it is blindingly obvious that if those [sex] drives have any natural purpose at all...then that purpose is to get people to use their sexual organs," is, I think, not so 'blindingly obvious.' "Sex drives" are not onlybiological, and so its expression is not only biological. A purpose of the sex drive is clearly the use of sexual organs, but that is not the only purpose. In sum, my brother's dilemma for the natural law tradition evaporates in light of a clearer understanding of the words of Jesus. I've also offered a reappraisal of the natural law position on the sex drive and it's relationship to sex organs.

Like meeting an old friend....

Tonight I rediscovered Beamish's Irish Stout. It's smoother than Guinness, so it goes down easier. The first (and only time, until tonight) I had it was a few years ago at one of the most confused restaurants I've been to--the Celtic Bayou. (Niche or identity crisis? You be the judge). If you like a good, rich stout, try this one.

Evolutionary Theory Confusions

My brother recently accused Mere-O of attempting to increase traffic by referencing "scantily clad women" (twice). I'm not sure anyone looking for said women would use "scantily" to find them. Regardless, it surely wouldn't bring the sort of reader Mere-O likes, so we'll try to avoid any more mentions of "scantily clad women" (did I say "scantily"?). One mention of Intelligent Design, though, will (hopefully!) bring the readers out en masse. Full disclosure: I am rather uninterested in the debate regarding the scientific merits of intelligent design, or in the scientific shortcomings of evolutionary theory (or vice versa). In fact, I remain uninterested in the claims of science itself (which, according to fellow Mere-O member Andrew, is nothing short of a vice, to which I reply, "So be it."). The claims of science are tentative, and I would much rather focus on the philosophical issues undergirding the actual science. For this reason, I share an affinity with ID. My confusion, though, is simply about a number of claims being made about the benefits of "evolutionary theory." In a recent post, ID theorist Bill Dembski said:

My suspicion, therefore, is that Josh Rosenau meant something much more plebeian when he referred to evolutionary theory as “creating cures.” What I suspect he is referring to is that bacteria, through a process of natural selection, tend to acquire immunity to antibiotics. Thus, for infections to be treated effectively, drug companies need to design new drugs to overcome the increased immunity of these bacteria. But, in that case, it is not the theory of evolution that provides insight into how to design new antibiotics that knock out bacteria that have developed an immunity to old antibiotics. Rather, it is the drug designer’s background knowledge and ability as a researcher that enables him or her to design appropriate new drugs that knock out these bacteria. All evolution is doing here is describing the process by which these bacteria acquire antibiotic resistance — not how to design drugs capable of overcoming that resistance.
In response, my brother litanized genetic mutations that we are now aware of. Additionally, in response to Dembski, Rosenau writes:
The ongoing campaign to reduce use of antibiotics is driven in large part by an understanding of evolution, and a concern that our bullpen of useful antibiotics is being depleted faster by evolved resistance than we're developing new drugs. That's evolution saving lives and alleviating suffering. Maybe you don't like that. Fine, look at the immune system. Whenever you are given an immunization, your body puts its immune system through natural selection. The cells which produce useful antibodies survive, the others are more likely to die off. As a theory, evolution predicts the effect of that, and explains how the immune system works and how it fails. Treating auto-immune disorders relies on our understanding of the evolution within the body.
It may be me, but it seems both my brother's and Rosenau's response miss Dembski's objection. Dembski seems to be accepting the fact that "evolution" identifies how and when bacteria acquire immunity to certain drugs, but that in order for lives to actually be saved (intelligent) researchers need to design a new drug that will effectively combat the now-immune bacteria. My brother's response that mutation happens and Rosenau's claim that evolution predicts the effects of the immune systems response to immunization don't actually address the substance of Dembski's claim. It does raise questions for me, though, about what "evolutionary theory" actually is. Clearly mutation happens on biological levels, and clearly on biological levels there is something like "survival of the fittest." However, these 'facts' seem no less difficult to harmonize with ID than with 'evolutionary theory.' The only difference is that an evolutionary theorist who does not accept agent causation as a valid form of (scientific?) explanation must explain all events in the universe using these categories, which just seems a tendentious. They must see the macro in light of the micro, which seems awfully reductionistic. The anticipated question for an ID theorist would simply be "How would ID predict the immune systems response to immunization better than evolutionary theory?" My reply is, on the micro-level, it doesn't seem to at all. This doesn't entail that the explanatory power of "evolutionary theory" in this instance disconfirms ID. Rather, it simply highlights that ID is a macro-scientific theory, and it's opponent "evolutionary theory" is as well, which means that rolling out specific instances (on either side) probably won't settle the issue. It also makes me more than a little suspicious that there are two competing philosophies of science at work and that philosophical naturalism is undergirding contempory science more than some would like to admit (rather than science justifying the claims of naturalism, as many more would like to admit!). Those are my thoughts. Perhaps I am over-simplifying the situation, but if I'm right, then I'm probably justified in continuing in my lack of zeal for the scientific aspects of evolutionary theory and intelligent design (whatever those are).

Saturday, June 11, 2005

My Reviews

My brother's comments about my recent string of book reviews have prompted me to say a word about my approach. He writes:

Oh, and I have a new goal in life: to write a book that meets my brother's critical approval, which is pretty darn stringent, as you know if you've been following his series of book reviews.
This is certainly true. While others have raved about Martindale's book, I was somewhat tepid in my commendation of it. This simply underscores the need to understand a particular reviewer's tastes and the need to read multiple reviews of books (something I attempt to do of the books and movies I review as well). I will continue to be critical, but my hope is that my recommendations will actually mean something. I reserve good recommendations for books that I think are worth taking the time to read or movies I think are worth seeing, just as I reserve my standing ovations for performances I think are actually outstanding. I have found American audiences much more free with standing ovations than the British, and I realized that they had lost meaning in America. My goal with my reviews is simply to give an accurate assessment of the work and to preserve my own credibility by not giving praise where it has not been duly earned. Not every book published is worth reading, and a reviewers job is to identify for everyone else which books actually are worth the time and effort. The limitation that I experience in reviewing Martindale's work is that I am not familiar enough with the secondary literature on Lewis to be able to compare it to an equivalent work. After reading Martindale's book, I began to wonder why there is a secondary literature on Lewis's work at all. Lewis seems too clear to actually be a serious object of study himself. But this is obviously a problem with the genre, not Martindale's work itself. Really, what this all means is that if I ever publish, the reviewers are going to have a field day with whatever I churn out.

Friday, June 10, 2005

Mind and Media Review--Beyond the Shadowlands

David begins his excellent review of Wayne Martindale's Beyond the Shadowlands: C.S. Lewis on Heaven and Hell by highlighting a conundrum. He wonders whether he should recommend Martindale's book to "those who have read a lot of Lewis or to those who have never read him." To that conundrum, I answer a resounding "neither." Martindale takes two approaches in his exposition of Lewis's notions of heaven and hell. In the first approach he uses Lewis's works to dispell certain myths about heaven and hell, myths that apparently Martindale thinks prevail in much of our thinking. These include ideas such as, "We'll be ghosts in heaven (or hell)," "Heaven is escapist thinking," and "All the interesting people will be in hell." In the second approach, he explicates Lewis's views on heaven and hell using his fictional works, demonstrating how Lewis uses myth to increase our longing for heaven. Martindale highlights two currents that run throughout Lewis's position on the afterlife. The first is that our desire for heaven needs strengthening. Fundamentally, we are more interested in the things of this life than the next, and find evil more attractive than goodness, which is nothing less than a perverted understanding of 'reality.' It is in The Screwtape Letters, I believe, that Lewis writes that one of Satan's biggest coups was getting us all to describe the horrors of war as "real," while dubbing the joys of watching small children play "strictly sentimental." The second current Martindale continues to return to is that for Lewis, we decide where we will spend eternity. Martindale highlights the various dodges Lewis makes on the relationship between freedom and predestination--he seems to suggest in Perelandra that they are two senses of the same referent--"Predestination and freedom were apparently identical." Regardless, Lewis is clear that our respective eternities are determined by who we are and nothing else. As Martindale writes:

One of the central truths of [The Great Divorce] is that Heaven is the fulfillment of human potential, Hell is the drying up of human potential. "To enter heaven is to become more human than you ever succeeded in being on earth; to enter Hell is to be banished from humanity. What is cast (or casts itself) into Hell is not a man: it is 'remains'".
Ultimately, Hell is the 'leaving alone' of man by God, which 'unmans' him. All of this, Martindale makes clear, but for someone with extensive knowledge of Lewis's books, the time spent with Martindale is largely unhelpful. Though there were moments of new insight into Lewis's works (his explication of 'Til We Have Faces was particularly helpful), Martindale's book is ultimately an attempt to sythesize ideas that are not very difficult to grasp from their original source. Even for my students (who have a decent amount of Lewis on their reading list) there will be few ideas in Martindale's book that they will not already be familiar with. For those who have never read any Lewis, Martindale's book may be helpful, but I am doubtful. It would be difficult to follow his analyses of Lewis's fiction without exposure to it. You can gather from Martindale's book who each character is, but my hunch is that Martindale's book would lack explanatory power that it otherwise has. Martindale seems to presume that his reader knows who, for instance, Reepicheep is (mentioning only once that "Mice run by instinct" and leaving it to the reader to make the clear inference that Reepicheep is a mouse). Martindale's book would seem most effective for someone with some exposure to Lewis's fiction, but who has only given it a cursory reading and not reflected about it at all. This, however, is neither the completely ignorant or the very familiar. Ultimately, Martindale's book is the sort of book that points beyond itself, and in this case points toward Lewis. This always makes me wonder whether it is really worth reading, or whether my time would be better spent simply reading Lewis. Martindale would obviously agree with this: Lewis would probably not, since he also points beyond himself to the real masters: Plato, Scripture, Augustine, Aquinas, etc. In this way, Martindale shares the humility of Lewis. Martindale has sat under his teacher, and now we must choose whether to sit under him or to join him as Lewis's pupils. If you are stretched for time (and who is not?), choose Lewis. The delights there are deeper and richer. If you can not yet comprehend Lewis, then let Martindale be your guide, for he is a faithful student and a clear teacher.

Thursday, June 09, 2005

Grammar Help

One of the best writers I know, my brother Jim, outlines the appropriate uses of "I" in the predicate. I taught myself sentence diagramming, but I didn't quite make it this far. Here's a shout-out for more interesting grammar tips like that one.

Wednesday, June 08, 2005

Cinderella Man

Two nights ago, I paid money to see a movie for only the second time this calendar year. It was well worth it. Ron Howard's Cinderella Man is a moving representation of the story of James Braddock, a boxer who earned the name "Cinderella Man" for his fightDetails about the real Braddock are here, and if the site is reputable, the movie is accurate. Braddock's career began with a rise to the top that ended with a 15-round decision that he lost. After that, the market crashed and Braddock's luck turned. Braddock endured a string of defeats that led to his being barred from boxing. After spending time on the docks, Braddock is given one more fight which begins his improbable return to glory. The movie, if predictable and sappy, is very enjoyable. Crowe's representation of Braddock is compelling, though his New Jersey accent is inconsistent. Zellweger's presence is not astounding, but certainly doesn't detract from the movie. What's more, it even had a 'family friendly' theme and a broadly agreeable presentation of Christianity. Though Braddock insists that "we must have some say in what goes on down here" and seems to move away from church, he seems more burnt out on shallow Christianity than anything else. An otherwise unnecessary final shot of a priest who thanks God for Braddock's win suggests that the filmmakers aren't wholly committed to Braddock's soft humanism. In all, the movie is a very emotionally engaging and satisfying experience. I highly recommend it to anyone able to watch fairly intense boxing scenes. You will find yourself saddened by Braddock's plight and urging him on to victory. I hope that despite a paltry 18.3 million opening weekend, this movie can become a success. Go see it and take your friends. If you enjoy happy endings, you won't be disappointed.

Saturday, June 04, 2005

Mind and Media Review--Unlock the Prison Doors

Terry Barber's Unlock the Prison Doors claims to contain "Keys to breaking the chains of habitual sin." Unfortunately, Barber's "keys" seem to be a bit rusty and over-used. Barber is obviously a very pious and devout man who has faithfully served the cause of Christ. Yet piety doesn't necessarily entail insight or depth of wisdom. Barber's book is full of cliched examples of sin and its effects (Uncle Ebee and the ever dangerous 'scantily clad woman'), unhelpful metaphors for the spiritual life ("Have you ever been in a spiritual dumpster?"), and over-worn, trivial, and ambiguous phrases ("spiritual pride"). Furthermore, there is an undergirding dichotomy between soul and body that is somewhat disconcerting. "We hear the Spirit and recognize our way of escape," Barber writes, "however the flesh or body has a very loud voice and the call of the flesh can be extremely difficult to ignore to say the least." Barber seems to identify the "life of the flesh" with "the body," which is an identification that is extremely problematic. I also think it unBiblical, as it has the effect of denigrating the physical in favor of the "spiritual." Barber's intrepretation of Romans 7 reinforces this notion. However, as has been argued here before, Barber's views are representative of broad currents of evangelicalism, so perhaps Barber can be excused on this count (especially since this is an undercurrent, and not the main theme). Regardless, Barber's book is neither theological enough nor psychological enough to adequately handle the problem of sin. One would be much better served by reading the equally pious and significantly more insightful works of Andrew Murray, whose mid-19th century distillations of Calvin's teachings on the Christian life are heart-warming, convicting, and illuminating. This is not to criticize Barber's life or ministry. I am sure his principles have changed many lives over the course of his ministry. However, for readers with even a rudimentary understanding of Scripture and Christianity, Barbers' book (direct quotations from Scripture--1/2 of the book--excepting) is unhelpful. It is milk for a sickness that demands meat.

LOTR Party

Another hat-tip goes to the Inklings class at Yorba Linda and their parents for putting on one of the best (and nerdiest!) parties I've been to in some time. We celebrated our twelve week journey through LOTR (some would call it Mordor) by watching all three extended editions in a row. I only made it through the first two. Some pics are below..... A true Peter-Jackson look-alike. The resemblance was uncanny. Yours truly, weilding the fiersome Sting. LOTR revisionists (i.e. Peter Jackson) beware. Nothing more to see here folks....move along.

A Fare-Forward to my Students

I have finished the year for STAR Torrey Academy. I still have some grading to do, but we had our last classes on Thursday and the banquet last night. I was unsure what to expect from my first year teaching, but I have discovered that I love the occupation and hope to do much more of it in the future. Of course, the curriculum I have to work with helps significantly. This year I taught a class called "Inklings" that had a reading list of Tolkien, Lewis, Charles Williams, Sayers, and Sheldon VanAuken (who slips in the back door somehow). If the great reading list wasn't enough, I also had students who were bright-eyed and hard-working. It was phenomenal to spend an entire year with high school age students and have almost no discipline problems. Those few problems I had were resolved when Mr. Granath landed in the pool, fully clothed, at the LOTR party in Yorba Linda. I will continue to teach in the program, but I will not be able to have all the same students that I have this year. At our end-of-the year banquet last night I said many difficult goodbyes to students that I will not have the joy of teaching next year. A word to those students: I hope and pray that you will be voyagers. There is a Voice above calling you to a new life, a life of learning and of exploration. It is a Voice calling you not to Life in spite of Death, but to Life through Death. There is a Voice that demands your allegiance and your obedience. It is none other than the Word who speaks out of Heaven, the Word spoken on Earth, who calls. In the words of the Poet, T.S. Eliot, "Not fare well, but fare forward, voyagers." The joys of heaven are not for the slack of heart--they are not for those whose desires are for thsi world. And so, fare forward. You will be missed and always be remembered as my first class of students. I love you, and thank you for your humbling words of encouragement this year. May you always be faithful to Christ our King.